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The spatial dimensions of manufacturing sectors are often revealed most sharply in cri-
sis times. During periods of «normal» business operations, broad regional and resource-
related patterns of industrial structuring may surely be documented, but structural diffe-
rences within sectors (such as textiles) can be more readily discerned when a key raw ma-
terial is withdrawn from the market and the responses of firms in the affected regions are
noted. American textile history offers two significant cases in this regard. First during the
Civil War consequent on the secession of eleven southem states (1861-65), the supply of
cotton to the northern textile centers was suddenly curtailed. Contrasts between the res-
ponses of manufacturers in Lowel1, Massachusetts and Philadelphia, two substantial fabric-
manufacturing cities, expose vivid distinctions between altemative approaches to produc-
tion practiced in the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions. Eighty years later, with the
advent of the Second World War, supplies of raw silk, nearly al1 of which was then secured
from Japan, became unobtainable. With this global market dimension paramount, a con-
trast between American and British reactions to the dearth of silk il1ustrates the different
historical placements of two national production systems in the hosiery trades, the most
prominent silk-using sector. In each case, both corporate power and the role of the state
in the economy are key elements in the crisis situation.
When threats of secession fol1owed the election of Abraham Lincoln to the American
Presidency in the fall of 1860, cotton markets were soon unsettled. Business stagnated ge-
neral1y as hopes for compromise with southern interests waned. With the opening of ar-
med conflict the next spring, directors of Lowel1's ten major corporations, chiefly manu-
facturers of low-priced cotton goods, faced a crucial decision. Due to their large-scale ope-
rations (the firms averaged over a thousand workers each) and bulk purchasing policies,
the firms held in stock enough raw cotton for a ful1 year's production. If the war were
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to be long and drawn out, it would be sensible to curtail production and stretch supplies
across several years as the company agents scoured international markets for new cotton
sources. Against this strategy however, the high overhead costs of these firms, including
expensive maintenance for the elaborate waterpower system that drove the mills, would
have to be met from reduced revenues. Still, anticipated increases in fabric prices might
well offset these fixed costs and stillleave a fair profit, given that raw materials had been
secured at low, pre-war rates. On the other hand, if the war was short, ayear or less in
duration, the corporations could reap windfall profits by running full, or by selling their
raw stock in the rapidly rising market. The early collapse of the rebel states would little
deform agricultural production; normal operations could resume following harvest of the
1862 cotton crops. Sharing the opinions of many northern newspaper editors, anticipating
a quick decision over the industrially-weak southem states, Lowell's directors chose this
second path, suspending production entirely by the fall of 1861 and selling off their ware-
housed bales of raw cotton at record prices.
Reaching for these short-term profits proved a grave miscalculation. The Lowell corpo-
rations dismissed nearly ten thousand workers, for whom this single-industry city offered
no alternative employment. The work-force was decimated as the city's population shrank
from 36,000 to 31,000 by 1865. Worse, as the war dragged on, the glow of the 1861 specula-
tive gains faded rapidly. By 1863, most of the firms had undertaken to re-start their frames
and looms to ease the gnawing effect of fixed maintenance and interest costs. But cotton
was scarce and expensive, rising toward a price of g-J cents a pound, seven times its cost
in 1860 (13 1/2 cents), To deal with this obstacle, several of the firms undertook «experi-
ments» in using wool, «abortive» efforts in which «they incurred losses, direct and indi-
rect, exceeding the amount of their entirecapital'ü. Though none of these finns went com-
pletely bankrupt, the Civil War and the cotton shortage was a catastrophe for corporate
Lowell and for its displaced textile workersvr.
Meanwhile, the same stimulus produced a radically diferent reponse in industrial Phila-
delphia, a city wich supported sorne 18,000textile workers at the outset of the War. Loca-
ted in the eastern metropolitan corridor roughly halfway between New York and Washing-
ton, D.C., Philadelphia was a multi-industry city in which knitting and weaving joined
with metalworking, machine-building (the Baldwin LocomotiveWorks), leather, boot and
shoe manufacturing, printing and apparel fabrication to create a diversified productive ba-
se. No cluster of giant corporations dominated its industrial geography; instead, in textiles
over four hundred propietary and family firms dotted its neighborhoods. When war nea-
red, leading merchants with southern connections (and a few prominent millmasters who
used cotton) held public meetings urging compromise over the questions of slavery and
states' rights within a federal system. However, once the struggle cornmenced, Philadelp-
hia textile mills soon ran day and night at afeverish pace. By 19-J0, the city held over 26,000
textile jobs and invested capital had more than doubled during the decade (from $9 to $22
million). Nearly two hundred new factories were erected in Philadelphia during the war,
many for rapidly expanding fabric producers. One of these firms, run by mill-experienced
English irnmigrants, alone snared nearly $1 million in war contracts for the Union Army
in addition to its general market businesst». While Lowell stagnated, textile Philadelphia
prospered.The cotton crisis had been a major disaster for the nation's best known textile
city; yet three hundred miles farther south, it had triggered dramatic growth in the Quaker
City. How may we account for this regional difference?
The plainest answer is that textile production at the two sites followed a pair of contrast-
ing industrial formats, one oriented toward bulk production and the other toward flexible
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specialization. These were historical alternatives which characterized respectively the «big
mill» system of New England cities such as Lowell, Lawrence or Manchester (New Hamp-
shire) and the propietary system current at Philadelphia, Providence (Rhode Island) and
Paterson (New Jersey). The Lowell corporations sought to generate a fairly narrow range
of standard staple cotton goods, aiming at a growing national market for shirtings, shee-
tings, etc. Their investment and production strategy was capital-intensive and engaged the
minimum of skilled labor, pioneering extensive use of young women as weavers and spin-
ners for a routine set of fabric constructions and yarn numbers. In technological terms,
the Lowell Machine Shops developed power looms which were, for their time, fast and
reliable. However, these cornmitments carried with them an internal contradiction: as tar-
geted as the system was on the efficient production of staples, it had but little potential
for flexibility. Innovation followed the track leading to faster and cheaper production, not
toward building in capacities for versatility. Hence when the raw materials crisis emerged
in 1861, Lowell's corporate leadership suffered under a set of constrained options. Neither
its skills nor its technology were suited to experiments at making something different. Nor
were its marketing agents familiar with volatiledemands for fashionable goods. Where
was Lowell to hire the experienced wool sorters necessary for handling a different fiber?
Thus, the price of rigidity proved high; one local historian credited the system's failings
in the 1860s with «beginning the long decline of Lowell's textile industrywu.
A relevant analogy to Lowell's experience from a later phase of American industrial his-
tory is the late 1920s disarray at the Ford Motor Company. In this case, an extremely rigid
production system was articulated for creation of a single complex item, the Ford Model
T, a masterpiece of standardization. While Ford's crisis was market-induced rather than
derived from materials problems, the sudden decline in sales of the company's hallmark
product stunned corporate leaders who had heavy investments in «dedicated»or single pur-
pose machine tools designed solely for the Model T and incapable of being adjusted for
other uses. Though introduction of the Model A Ford was accelerated, at tremendous cost,
General Motor's attention to versatility and styling (what David Hounshell has called «fle-
xible mass production») gave it a tremendous market advantage. Ford's retooling for the
Model A entailed rebuilding sixteen thousand machine tools and scrappint eight thousand
others, at an expense of $18 million. During the transition years, 1926-7, Ford's net losses
topped $100 million, the paradoxical fruit of perfecting mass productionat the expense
of flexibilityw.
It was just this flexibility which proved Philadelphia's strength in the cotton «famine».
The propietary system in 1860 was a network of interrelated small and midsize firms each
.devoted to one element in the textile manufacturing sequence: raw materials preparation,
spinning, weaving or knitting, dyeing and finishing. Though tons of cotton were annually
processed by these specialists, wool was also used quite generally. Cotton-wool blends we-
re cornmon products (e.g. cotton-warp cassimeres), and the recycling of mill waste and
shredding of rags was evident in each of the mill districts. Yarn spinners were experienced
in meeting variable demands for blends, quality and counts; weavers regulary switched
from product to product depending on season and demand expectations. As most firms
were started by skilled workers with small capitals, often on millfloors rented with or wit-
hout power, the pattern of skill-intensive flexibility was established early. In the crisis, carpet
weavers quick1y substituted jute warps for cotton; spinners turned to rag shredders for sup-
plies of reprocessed cotton, bleached by nearby dyers. Weavers and knitters who had sea-
sonally shifted from cottons to wools began to experiment with light-weight worsted for
surnmer use. Sorne exclusively cotton-oriented companies showed their versatility by suc-
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cessfully adapting their looms to ron woolen blankets for the Union Army, only to switch
back of cotton products after the War. Germantown's hosiers, many of them Nottinghem
and Leicester men, also tumed to military production and made fortunes from federal con-
tracts (six such firms had atotal capital of $250,000 in 1860 and $822,000 in 1870)(6).
Thus the raw materials crisis highlighted an aspect of spatial differentiation in industrial
development, a divergence which indicated the parallel existence of two approaches to ac-
cumulation within the dynamics of American capitalismo The Lowell format aimed at cap-
turing economies of scale and mass marketing through capital-intensive production ofbulk
staples. Modest pre-yard margins would generate sizable profits given sufficient volume.
However, the low-skill requirements that the technological vector of this pattern encom-
passed created opportunities for competition to develop along staple lines wherever capital
and labor could be matched with power and materias supplies. Hence, the system was vul-
nerable toreplication, first in other New England cities, then in the American South, as
well as to the raw materials crisis discussed above. On the other hand, the proprietary
system of interlaced flexible specialists was focused on batch production of a continually-
changing variety of goods. Its demand for skill and need for an agglomeration of mutually-
reinforcing firms placed powerfulllocational constraints on this approach; a handful of
Atlantic Coast cities were the only sites where a sufficient critical mass of the necessary
components accumulated and sustained its development. High-unit profits were derived
from the economies of timing inherent in attemps tomeet fluctuating markets; conversely,
errors in styling or selections of materials' quality quickly proved fatal to fledgling firms.
Nonetheless, such complexes offlexible specialization were little vulnerable to outmigra-
tiorror competition from the South, remote from flows of skilled irnmigrant labor and from
the New YorkCity market hube Foreign competition, from similarly-structured textile centers
in Yorkshire or at Lyons, was much feared however -hence the obsession of Philadelphia
propietors with defending high tariff walls. State emergency spending during the Civil War
crisis did much to spur accumulation for such firms, and the political force of protectionist
legislation later served to secure wartime gains against products from intemationally-
recognized centers of design innovation in France and Britain.
From this example it is evident that conceptualizing skill-intensive small manufacturing
as an early stage in the «natural» progress of a market system toward capital-intensive mass
production is a dangerously reductive notion. The role ofthe state in accumulation plainly
undermines explanations based on the invisible hand of «free» markets as the core motor
of corporate success. Awareness of the diversity .of market demands indicares that there
should be a varietyof optimal solutions to the puzzles of accumulations and profit, which
the existence of durable and variant regional industrial formats in the United States docu-
ments. However, by the time of the Second World War, corporate domination of wide sec-
tors of the American economy was clear. Though there is hardly room here to illustrate
the process by which a self-conscious standardization of product and demand tilted the
economy toward mass output of narrow product lines'?', the silk crisis of 1941 does cap-
ture a number of the key themes involved.
Whereas there are a number of basic similarities between the silk and cotton shortages
eighty years apart, their differences are equally noteworthy. In both cases, warfare left in-
dustries long used to ample supplies oftheir main raw materialwithout hope for alternati-
ve sources, as the producing regions were now military antagonists. In both cases, a pro-
cess of adjustment. with a variety of missteps, .was set in motion; and the crisis involved
both state action and the futures of hundreds of firmsand tens of thousands of their wor-
kers. However, si1kin 1941 in no way had the same importancewithin the textile economy
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that cotton had had in 1861. Further, silk had been for a generation under threat from a
substitute fiber, rayon, for many of its uses in the American market. Finally, the state in
1941 was prepared to take command of materials in the comprehensive administration or
a war economy, something neither imaginable nor feasible in the Lincoln years. Still, fo-
cusing on a major textile sector in wich silk remained the overwhelmingly dominant fiber,
one in which rayon had achieved little penetration, a sector which alone employed over
90,000 workers, we may better assess the impact of the raw materials crisis and the role
of the state in shaping its resolution. Thus the experience of the American hosiery industry
will be reviewed, with a brief treatment of British hosiery firms' contemporaneous situa-
tion providing a comparative contexto
By the 1930s, silk had lost considerable ground to rayon in the weaving trades, even
at Paterson, New Jersey, long the center of specialty manufacture of broadsilks and rib-
bons. Improvements in the quality and dyeing properties of rayon fibers, together with a
price fall from over $1.00 to c.$.55 per pound brought the shift of thousand of silk looms
to rayon and the establishment of plain rayon weaving in sorne southern cotton-mill com-
munities. As rayon's price was stabilizing well under a dollar, silk prices, as always, fluc-
tuated every month at much higher levels (ranging from under $2.00 to $4.63 per pound
.during the depression years)(8). However, in hosiery silk remained preeminente Whereas
in 1941, total U.S. rayon consumption neared 600 million pounds (more than ten times
the volume of silk use), in hosiery silk was the base for 80% of all production, the balance
divided among rayon, cotton, and wool. In the sector's flagship division, women's full-
fashioned hosiery, silk constituted 95 % of all fibers knittedt?'. All raw silk was imported.
Hence it is in the hosiery trades that the impact of the silk cut-off was most keenly felt.
In the 1920s, roughly halfthe raw silk carne from China and Italy, the balance from
Japan. By the late 1930s, the role ofthe first two nations had become negligible, and Japa-
nese exports mounted to over 90 % of American purchases. The deterioration of American
relations with Japan drove import prices skyward, the average New York quotations rising
from $1.69 in 1938 to nearly $3.00 in 1941. As market prices for silk hosiery were ·resistant
to upwards movements, manufacturers were already in a squeeze before President Frank-
lin Roosevelt ordered all raw silk frozen for military use in August 1941. A few month
later, war put an end to the trickling flowof spot purchases and panic spread through the
hosiery industry. The ensuing scenario, orchestrated by the government's wartime Office
of Price Management and featuring major chemical corporations among the players, did
much to ease the crisis and determine the ultimate course of American hosiery produc-
tion. Though rayon had been a disappointment in American hosiery markets, particulary
in women's wear, it soon became the officially-designated substitute, as silk and duPont's
novel nylon were quickly reserved for military end-uses (e.g, parachutesjtv'. Manufactu-
rers, whose Civil War predecessors had scrambled after the main chances offered by en-
treprenuership in that emergency, were in this situation reduced to fringe characters strug-
gling to stretch «allotments» of rayon and to solve technical and marketing problems con-
sequent on its use.
State action to control prices and supplies prevented analogies to the Lowell strategy
of 1861. The price of silk was fixed at $3.08 per pound with the federal authorities being
the only customers for such supplies as were present, negating any dreams of speculative
gains from selling raw silk. Thougha huge demand shift to nylon was recorded late in
1941, with a third of full fashioned hose being all or part nylon in December, the limits
of duPont's productive capacity, the high price ($3.00-3.95 per pound), and increasing mi-
litary calls for the new synthetic ended hopes in that direction early in 1942. This snift
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however, underscores the flexible orientation of the hosiery ttades, nearly half of whose
capacity lay in the mid-Atlantic region. Earlier, rising silk prices had led these firms to
use rayon after 1938 for the feet and tops of stockings, reserving silk for the legs. This
ready substitution of materials opened the way to a broad scale rayon transition in 1942.
By the end of that year, 91% of the fullfashioned hose manufactured (2.73 of 3.00 million
dozen pairs made in December) were rayon, with 7% cotton and 2% other(ll).
Thus far this account shows an awkward but successful crisis shift from one raw mate-
rial to another, a process utilizing the flexibility of the hosiery sector's capacity and the
organizational reach of war bureaucratization. However, the rayon transition had its under-
side, for its effects were regionally quite different. In the older centers ofhosiery manufac-
ture, e.g. Philadelphia, the war crisis sounded a death knell; elsewhere, especially in south-
em states which adopted basic knitting technology during the 1920s, industrial successes
bloomed. Eighty years later in a different conjuncture, Philadelphia experienced the war
shock somewhat as Lowell had in the 1860s. By 1950, 55 % of the 1700 full fashioned ma-
chines active in 1940 Philadelphia had been scrapped while the southern share of overall
knitting capacity rose annuallyü-'. What had happened?
The interaction of three factors, relating to labor, raw materials, and product standardi-
zation, helped wither Philadelphia's role in hosiery manufacturing. First, the city was the
national center of unionized textile labor. The Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Wor-
kers washeadquartered in Philadelphia and had had its greatest organizing successes in
northeastern and midwestern states. Few hosiery workers in the South were paid union
rates, the resulting interregional wage differential varying form 20 to 35 % in the 1930s
and 40s. So long as Philadelphia firms used their flexibility to respond quick1y to fashion
shifts, this wage gap was of onIy marginal importance. Ordinary staple silk hose might
well be made in low-wage districts, but Philadelphia's proximity to the New York market
and its considerable pool of skilled knitters meant the slightest twitch of fashion could be
detected and exploited profitably. However, with the switch to rayon, much ofthis advanta-
ge vanished promptly. Silk yarns were made from «raws» which varied widely in quality
and price, and were available fromscores of «throwsters» who competed with one another
for hosiery yarn sales. Shrewd proprietors who could take advantage of this competition
through close observation of nearby throwing markets could save part of their higher labor
costs through timely purchases of materials of just good enough quality to meet the mar-
ket's demands. Rayon, in contrast, was manufactured in a fairly restricted range of counts
(deniers) by a small group of giant chemical firms (Celanese, duPont, American Viscose,
etc.). Their pricing was standardized, as were their products; sharp-bargainingQuaker City
proprietors got no better price on rayon yarns than did their distant southem competitors,
a factorwhich thus emphasized the labor differential's role in interregional competition.
Third, product differentiation was a practice at which mid-Atlantic hosiers were long ex-
perienced. If price levels were gradually becoming more inelastic due to the practices of
major retailing concems, style conscious manufacturers could use their skill base to add
a wide range of colors, a patterned effect on the heel, or sorne other distinctive touch to
clinch a batch of orders for the new season(l3). Once the federal standardization of appa-
rel grades radically restricted the variety if goods which could be marketed during warti-
me, this capacity became irrelevante The rayon hosiery market, becoming increasingly uni-
forrn through state action not consumer preference, vaporized the advantages flexible spe-
cialist firms once held.
To the extent that a sector's production options narrow towards a small group of final
goods, one rather than several optimal formats for successful accumulation becomes do-
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minant, that of least-cost throughput of maximally-standardized goods, This is roughly what
happened in the wake of the silk crisis, ending both the role of silk as a hosiery raw mate-
rial and the vitality of a flexible alternative to mass-production in this textile sector. It is
of course theoretically plausible that a radical differentiation of demande can likewise wreck
the viability of a bulk production system, bringing forth an explosion of small, specialty
manufacturers whose versatility is the key to their survival. Something like this has happe-
ned in Scots tweeds and specialty ltalian textiles in recent years(14). (Whether the balance
of forces at present favors further development of standardization or differentiation is a
subject of considerable current debate(15).)
The silk crisis had a rather different impact on the British hosiery industry during World
War 11, though its structure of production bore a striking resemblance to the American
situation. In the 1930s, British hosiers were generally specialist firms who bought knitting
yarn from independent spinners, and sent out their stockings to separate dyeing establish-
ments. The industry was decentralizing from its core region (Leicester and Nottingham),
and flexible capacity was a common feature of the production system. This entailed the
use of a «large variety of yarns» by manufacturers; indeed, it was reported that «one large
concern in Nottingham... ordinarily buys its yarn from 200 spinners»(16). This capacity
together with the quite different market base for British hosiery, made the silk stoppage
a minor difficulty. Unlike the U.S., silk was by no means so dominant an element in the
British raw material s mix. In the 1935 Census of Production, silk stockings represented
only 16% of total quantity manufactured and 28 % of total values, the higher latter figure
reflecting the expense of the raw material. Whereas cotton and woolen hose had become
a tiny fragment of American output, in Britain, the «cult of wool» continued, as these two
materials accounted for aboye half of all hosiery sales. Moreover, rayon hosiery comman-
ded nearly a quarter of the market in 1935(17). Thus, the end of silk supplies was greeted
with equanimity.
Nonetheless, the activities of the state in Britain pressed toward a similar standardiza-
tion of product and demand through war regulations which restricted the range of colors
and yarns to be used. In stockings for example, the number of shades was reduced from
200 to six. This effort, involving a dramatic narrowing, a «rationalization in the number
and types of products-vü, lessenedthe value of flexibility while enhancing the viability
of firms oriented toward bulk production. In one respect, the British government went well
beyond the industrial interventions of its American counterpart. In 1941 a «schemeof con-
centration- was introduced which encouraged amalgamations or «marriages» of smaller
firms in the context of a «regulation of demand» and «restrictions on the volume and cha-
racter of production» ..In Leicestershire alone, sorne «450 hosiery firms were concentra-
ted», about half the number active nationally a few years before de war. This represented
another dimension of «rationalization» through non-market pressures of an industry regar-
ded as having excess capacity. Despite the emergency nature of these mergers, one obser-
ver noted: «It will be surprising if a number of the marriages brought about under wartime
concentration do not become permanent-é'".
In the United States, the dependence of the hosiery industry on silk imports exposed
it fully to the wartime supply crisis. The action of the government in directing rayon subs-
titution created a new sort of dependency for the industry, reliance on an oligopolistic cor-
porate supply lineo When nylon became again available after the war, this dependence nar-
rowed for a time to a single supplier, duPont, for whom the fiber was a proprietary innova-
tion. This standardization of materials' supply and price, together with the extension of
simplified product lines into de post-war era, ended the utility ofthe production approach,
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flexible specialization, which had served Philadelphia's textile enterprises so well in the
1860s crisis. On the American scene, its geographic consequences included further ero-
sion of productive capacity in older urban, skill-using regions and a spur to continued growth
of hosiery manufacturing in peripheral, low-waged districts. Silk's far less essential role
in British hosiery manufacturing, more differentiated in materials choice than the Ameri-
can industry, meant that its unavailability proved relatively tangential to hosiery enterpri-
ses' war experience. However, the industry did not escape the impact of state direction,
experiencing a parallel standardization of materials and product as well as state-managed
mergers, which as in the U.S., helped transform the industrial structure toward mass pro-
duction of staple hosiery and away from the diversity that characterizes flexible
specialization.
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Dues crisis de materíes primeres en la historia del textil americá
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Resum
Sobtades escasseses de materies primeres clau mostren sorprenents contrastos regio-
nals en la geografia deIs textils, En la historia deIs textils als Estats Units cal remarcar
dues crisis d'aquest tipus. La primera, durant la Guerra Civil, ens il-lustra la rigidesa del
sistema corporatiu Lowell i la flexibilitat de la producció textil en I'área de Filadelfia du-
rant els anys de la fam del cotó. La interrupció deis' subministres de seda durant la 2a
Guerra Mundial va commocionar el sector deIs generes de punt, essent l'estat i els pro-
veídors eorporats del raió com a fibra substitutiva els qui van jugar els papers més impor-
tants a 1'hora d' alterar la producció. Es remarquen els diferents impactes regionals de
la crisi de la seda i s' introdueix el contrast británic per donar emfasi a les diferencies
estructural s industrial i geográfica.
Deux crises de matíeres premíeres dans I'histoire des textiles americains
Resumé
Subites manques de matieres premieres montren contrastes régionaux surprenantes dans
la geographie des textils. Dans l'histoire des textils aux Etats Unis il-y-a deux crises réle-
vantes. La prerniere pendant la Guerre Civil nous montre la rigidité du systeme corporati-
ve Lowell et la flexibilité de la production textile dans I'aire de Philadelphia pendant les
annes de la famine du coton. Le coup en la provision de la soie pendant la Ileme Guerre
Mondiale a frappé le secteur du tricot americain, oú l'Etat et les provisioneurs du rayon
comme une fibre sustitutive ont joué les roles principaux en alterant la production. Les
differents impacts de la erisi sont remarqués et on introduit le contraste britanique pour
donner emphase aux differences dans l' estructure industriel et la geographie.
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